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1 Introduction
The analysis of the multilateral trading system and multilateral trade reforms
has recently utilized two types of frameworks. The first is the theory of piece-
meal policy reforms initiated by Hatta (1977) and applied first to trade policy
reforms by Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988, 1991). This has been extended
further e.g. by Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000a,b, 2004) and Raimondos-
Møller and Woodland (2006). The second strand draws on the research on the
political economy of trade policies. Using national welfare functions that are
consistent with various types of political economy considerations e.g. Bagwell
and Staiger (1999, 2002, 2006) have characterized the role of GATT/WTO rules
in allowing the world to achieve an eﬃcient solution to trade policy problems. In
this framework the objective function on which national policy making is based
diﬀers, in general, from social welfare functions that are based alone on individ-
ual welfares (like e.g. the utilitarian social welfare function)1. This contrasts
with the theory of piecemeal multilateral policy reforms which are based on the
assuming policy makers to maximize social welfare. The contrast is strongest
when, as is often the case, the welfare analysis is based on the assumption of
a representative individual. Thus, one strand of research separates the policy
relevant national welfare function from the social welfare function, in the other
strand the national and social welfare functions are identical.
In this paper the theory of piecemeal policy reform is extended to the case
of a national welfare function that is separate from the social welfare function.
A classic example leading to a diﬀerentiation between policymakers and citizens
welfare functions are merit goods. As Atkinson and Stigliz (1980, p. 8) write:
"This is diﬀerent from the arguments concerning externalities and public goods,
in that with merit wants, the "public" judgement diﬀers from the private eval-
uation, rejecting a purely individualistic view of society."2 The analysis here is
based on the recent models of merit goods. These models are quite general and
can capture also political economy arguments e.g. such as lobbying by inter-
est groups. At the same time, merit goods have a definite role in the theory
of public finance making it easier to connect them to the theory of piecemeal
multilateral trade reform.
Merit goods can be a particularly natural way to model how national con-
cerns or nationalism, in general, impacts on trade policy negotiations. Take the
following lengthy quotation from Pascal Lamy, the EU trade commissioner at
the time (2004) he made the remarks: "In a speech delivered in Brussels on 15
September, European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy presented a case for consid-
eration of so-called ’collective preferences’ (or ’collective choices’) in trade relations.
When communities make practical decisions based upon their social values — for ex-
1There, of course, exist studies on the properties of the multilateral trading system where
government objective is based on the standard notions of welfare, see ch. 2 in Bagwell and
Staiger (2002).
2Kotakorpi (2006) shows that citizens’ weakness of will modelled using hyperbolic dis-
counting can lead to merit good type of an argument if policy makers or the policy making
institutions do not suﬀer from the same weakness.
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ample, a government could decide to ban the sale of certain drugs — the value that
prompted the decision, in this case health, can be called the community’s ’collective
preference’ . Thus, collective preferences can be thought of as social values that are
implied in a community’s practical decisions and concrete results that can be seen by
those inside and outside the community. Lamy described trade as the "natural point
of intersection for diﬀerent systems of collective preferences", bringing two legitimate
demands into potential conflict, namely the need to honour WTO commitments and
the right to exercise legitimate social choices based upon collective preferences.
Lamy acknowledged that defining collective preferences could be ambiguous and
open to dispute given that they were not always rational and evolved over time from
cultural and religious values, political considerations, historical factors and the level of
development. By way of example, he outlined certain European ’collective preferences’,
including multilateralism, environmental protection, food safety, cultural diversity,
public provision of education and healthcare, precautions in the field of biotechnology,
and welfare rights. He said that diﬀerent collective preferences among countries are
essentially complementary although experiences have shown that conflicts can arise.
Diﬀering attitudes to assessing and managing risks related to biotech products, which
have surfaced in the ongoing WTO dispute between the US/Argentina/Canada and
the EU ... were a "case in point" for highlighting diﬀerences in collective preferences,
he added.
Trade presented a particular challenge in this area, he noted, since the underlying
stakes are considerable (i.e. the exporting countries’ trade interests may run counter
to the importing country’s collective preferences), and trade was the only area in which
there was an eﬀective and binding mechanism for settling disputes. Yet it might be
diﬃcult to say just who the community is that governments are giving voice to by
representing their ’collective preferences’ in international forums; many fear that spe-
cial interest groups could use the term to justify protecting uncompetitive industries.
"Liberals might see it as opening a Pandora’s box of arbitrary barriers; the South-
ern countries as protectionism and euro-centrism in disguise; and environmentalists
and human-rights activists might see it as representing an unacceptable status quo
because it fails to put pressure on those who infringe social standards and destroy the
environment," he acknowledged.
Lamy commended the WTO’s Appellate Body for being a "faithful guardian" of
collective preferences under the WTO system by balancing wider public concerns with
WTO principles such as non-discrimination as well as with rules of international public
law. However, he said that both WTO rules and case law are incomplete and leave
room for interpretation. "That is one of the reasons Europe wanted WTO negotiations
to include discussions on clarifying the relationship between the WTO and multilateral
environmental agreements", he said.
Lamy argued that sustainability impact assessment could help to reveal trading
partners’ collective preferences. "This, in turn, would make it possible to anticipate
any conflicts that might arise from greater openness, by revealing incompatibilities
between collective preferences before greater openness made them apparent, and by
examining possible solutions," he said. He also suggested the use of a special safe-
guard clause to clarify how collective preferences might be integrated into WTO rules,
thereby ensuring that "trade integration will not pose a threat to legitimate collective
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preferences". Such a clause would be subject to two conditions, namely a requirement
to demonstrate that there really was a coherent underlying social demand to justify the
measure, and that the measure complied with the basic principles of the trading sys-
tem, such as non-discrimination proportionality, national treatment and transparency.
The clause would also have to be accompanied by a compensation mechanism, which
would serve to partially compensate the aﬀected exporters, thereby placing the re-
sponsibility on communities to bear the external cost of measures that reflect their
societal choices."3
Lamy’s points of view correspond closely to Ernest Gellner’s view of nation-
alism as an idea combining political unity with nationally homogenous culture
(Gellner 1997, ch. 1)4. Gellner also observes that nationalism has had di-
rect connection to trade policies, e.g. in Germany through Listian protection
of infant industries (Gellner 1997, p. 35), exactly like Lamy sees the connec-
tion between what he calls ’collective preferences’ and the multilateral trading
system. In another speech given in India5, Lamy said "Like India, we believe
agriculture is somewhat diﬀerent - intimately tied up with how we run our rural
economy society, and landscape."
Nationalism is also important from the point of view of standard political
economy arguments. Recently Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found, in a cross coun-
try study using data on individual attitudes, that non-economic determinants
(like values) must be taken into account when one tries to explain cross-country
variation in attitudes towards towards trade. In particular, nationalist senti-
ments are associated with protectionist views. These sentiments also seem to
get reflected in trade flows: Disdier, Mayer and Tai (2006) report that bilateral
trade flows in movies is very much influenced by cultural factors (e.g. similar-
ity in religion). They also show that bilateral trade in movies, which they use
as an indicator of cultural similarity, is a significant determinant of the overall
bilateral trade flows. Felbermayr and Toubal (2006) use the results from the
European Song Contest to measure cultural aﬃnity between European coun-
tries and show that cultural aﬃnity increases trade flows. These results echo
the results from Rose (2000).
Cultural and social issues come up also when one deals with standards.
While it is the case that standards e.g. health standards can be used like trade
policies to protect domestic interests (e.g. Fischer and Serra 2000) there exists
regional trade agreements that call for harmonization of those measures in the
member countries. In the latter case one can also think of common culture
having an eﬀect on the standard setting. One point made in this paper is that
countries with similar views on merit goods should be allowed to form a kind of
non-preferential trading area.
3The quotation is found at the following address: http://www.ictsd.org/biores/04-09-
23/story4.htm of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ISTSD).
4Generally, the various definitions of nationalism proposed seem to emphasize the role
of idea of a nation as separate from the individuals of which it consists of, as some-
thing unifying and styaing above the people. See the Nationalism project homepage,
http://www.nationalismproject.org/what.htm.
5http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla206_en.htm
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The issues brought up in this paper are related also to the problem of issue
linkage. In this literature (e.g. Ederington 2002) the issue is whether some
other policy issues, even some purely domestic issues should be brought to ne-
gotiations simultaneously with trade policies. Here we focus is on the question
whether multilateral trade policies can reflect domestic policy concerns and at
the same time benefit all the parties. The other side of the coin of issue linkage
is national sovereignty: National sovereignty roughly means that possibilities to
conduct policies other than trade policies should not be reduced by a reduc-
tion of tariﬀ barriers or trade policies should not matter for the conduct for
these other type of policies6. Recently Bagwell and Staiger (2004) have shown
that the basic GATT/WTO rules ensure national sovereignty in this sense. In
this paper it is argued that multilateral trade agreements themselves can be ad-
justed to accommodate national needs without making multilateral tariﬀ reform
impossible.
The merit good argument for protection in agriculture is getting weaker as
currently the pressure against developed country agricultural policies is getting
heavier in the WTO. The same holds for cultural goods also even though it is not
as visible as the agricultural dispute. An interesting question thus is whether
merit goods are a hindrance to reaching consensus on multilateral trade policy
reform. In general, as such merit goods should not be a hindrance to reforms:
without co-ordination countries can have (in a Nash equilibrium) too high tariﬀs
to protect domestic cultural goods and a multilateral tariﬀ reduction may bebefit
all of them. One of the aims in this paper is to analyze to what extent and
under which conditions a general tariﬀ reduction is mutually beneficial when
merit goods are an important part of policy making.
The basic model of merit goods and optimum commodity taxation was built
by Besley (1988). Recently, Schroyen (2005) has shown that the Besley formu-
lation has several undesirable features. It e.g. implies that private consump-
tion of a merit good should be taxed if the elasticity of substitution between
it and other commodities is low. This paper uses the general formulation of
the merit good by Blomqvist and Micheletto (2006), which contains the model
proposed by Schroyen (2005) as a special case. The model is placed in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework of international trade and tariﬀs first analyzed in
Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988, 1991) and later applied by e.g. Keen and
Wildasin (2004), Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006) and Turunen-Red
and Woodland (2004)7.
In the international trade literature, merit good type of arguments have
been treated under the theory of optimal policies in the presence non-economic
objectives (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1969, Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan
1998 contains a textbook presentation). In this theory non-economic objectives
are presented as additional constraints to the optimization problem facing the
policy makers whose objective is to maximize private utility. The constraints
6These other type of policies should not have any direct international eﬀects (like pollution
cross the national boundaries).
7Kotakorpi (2006) analyzes international commodity tax competition in the presence of
merit goods in a two country model.
4
can take e.g. the form of a self-suﬃciency constraint restricting the imports
of some goods. The merit good models are more general models in that the
constraints are implicit in the policy makers objective function.
2 Merit goods and divergence between private
and government utilities
Let there be N goods. Assume that good 1 is the numeraire good (i.e. the
world market price of that good is set equal to unity). Let the consumer utility
function (with all the standard properties) be
u = u (x1, ..., xn, ..., xN ) ≡ u (x) (1)
where xn = (private) consumption of good n. With merit goods the government
utility function diﬀers from the private utility function. It is given as
ug = ug (x) (2)
where ug is a concave function of private consumption of the goods. Thus,
the marginal government utility of a good can be either positive or negative.
This is a very general formulation of the policy objective function, and in a way
generalizes the objective function used by Bagwell and Staiger (e.g. 1999, 2006).
(2) is called the national welfare function from now on.
One should also note that even though the government preferences are de-
fined over the consumption basket of private citizens, it can take into account
political concerns over domestic production. Assume that all goods are Arming-
ton substitutes, i.e. otherwise identical goods but produced in diﬀerent countries
are imperfect substitutes. If the government is concerned with national produc-
tion of some good, government preference for domestic consumers consuming
the domestically produced good gives it an incentive to tax imports of foreign
substitutes to it. This supports domestic production of the good.
To derive a connection between the national and private utilities, recall first
that consumer choices are contained in the expenditure function giving the
minimum expenditure required to reach the given level of welfare:
E (p, u) (3)
Since
xn (p, u) = Epn (p, u)
where Epn (p, u) ≡ ∂E∂pn (p, u) national welfare can be written as
ug = ug
µ
∂E
∂p1
(p, u) , ...,
∂E
∂pN
(p, u)
¶
≡ ug (p, u) (4)
For private utility function, first notice that
u ≡ u
µ
∂E
∂p1
(p, u) , ...,
∂E
∂pN
(p, u)
¶
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This leads to
1 = u1Ep1u + ...+ unEpnu ≡ u|xEpu
and
0 = u|xEppdp
where ux = column vector of private marginal utilities with | denoting the
transpose, Epp = the Slutsky matrix, and Epu = (Ep1u, ..., EpNu)
| .8
From (4) one gets dug = (ugx)
| Epudu+(ugx)
| Eppdp, which can be rewritten
as
dug = [1 + (ugx)
| Epu − u|xEpu] du+ [(ugx)
| Epp − u|xEpp] dp = (5)
[1 + (ugx − ux)
| Epu] du+ (ugx − ux)
| Eppdp ≡ (1 +∆|Epu) du+∆|Eppdp
where ∆ ≡ ugx−ux. From (5) one sees that the relationship between changes in
private utility and national welfare, at given prices, is determined by the term
1 +∆|Epu. We assume that national welfare, at given prices, always increases
if private utility increases, and vice versa:
A1: 1 +∆|Epu > 0.
This certainly holds if the diﬀerences between private and national marginal
utilities, ∆, is "small" enough. More generally A1 holds if commodities with
high income elasticity of demand do not reduce government welfare.9Also, if
some inferior goods, goods with Epiu < 0, are demerit goods, goods for which
increased consumption reduces national welfare ugxi < 0 but which have positive
private marginal utility uxi > 0, A1 also tends to hold. Among these type of
goods one can include low quality alcohol.
Denote next G ≡ (1 +∆|Epu)−1. Then (5) implies that
du = Gdug −G∆|Eppdp (6)
The world consists of M countries, denoted by the superscript m = 1, ...,M .
Let pw be the (column) vector of world market prices. We choose the "world
market" good 1 to be the numeraire and set its price equal to unity. The world
market prices of all the other goods relative to good 1 are denoted by qw, thus
pw| = (1, qw|). We consider only trade policy reforms. Let accordingly tm =
tariﬀs (or export taxes or export or import subsidies) imposed by country m.
8The following notation is followed: fx denotes the (vector of) partial derivative(s) of
function f with respect to variable x, fxy the (matrix of) second order derivative(s).
9 Since demand for good i is
xi = Epi (p, v (p, I))
where v (p, I) = the indirect utility function and I = consumer income, we get
∂xi
∂I
= EpiuvI =
Epiu
Eu
and
∂xi
∂I
=
EpiuI
EuEpi
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Then, country m c.i.f. prices are pm = p+ tm. These are the prices facing both
consumers and producers. With these (6) becomes, for each country,
dum = Gmdugm −Gm∆m|Emppdpm (7)
This has to be incorporated in the model of equilibrium in the world markets.
3 World trade equilibrium with merit goods
Consumer decisions in a country are summarized by th expenditure function
Em (pm, um). Similarly, assuming markets to be competitive, the production
decisions in each country can be summarized by the revenue or GDP-function
Gm (pm) (8)
with all the well-known properties (Dixit and Norman 1980, Woodland 1982).
With the help of the expenditure and GDP functions the external transactions
of a country are collected by the net revenue function Sm:
Sm (pm, um) ≡ Gm (pm)−Em (pm, um) (9)
Obviously Smpm = net exports from country m.
The equilibrium in the world economy is then a solution (assumed to exist)
to the following equations:X
m
Smpmn = 0, n = 1, ..., N (10)
pw>Sm = τm,m = 1, ...,M (11)X
m
τm = 0 (12)
(10) is the equilibrium condition for the world good markets: the sum of net
supplies of each commodity coming from individual countries must equal 0. As
usual, not all of the goods market equilibrium conditions are independent. By
Walras’ Law one of the equilibrium conditions is redundant, and can be dropped
out, and let it be the equilibrium condition for good 1.
We study international trade reforms which include also international income
transfers, as is the tradition in the literature. For the study of nationalism and
merit goods this may not be totally unrealistic. E.g. the still prevailing EU
sugar policy implies, in eﬀect, a lump sum transfer to some countries (the ACP
countries) adversely aﬀected by the policy. EU allows from these countries im-
ports subject to a quota that has been binding all the time. The ACP sugar
exporters are paid the same price as EU sugar farmers receive. With the quota
binding this is equivalent to handing out a lump sum transfer to ACP produc-
ers. After the WTO declared the current EU practice conflicting with the WTO
rules, EU has announced a policy where it would allow all non-EU sugar produc-
ers to import to EU (subject still to a quota) and would pay a subsidy to ACP
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sugar farmers to improve their productivity or to switch producing something
else.
(11) imposes the aggregate budget constraint for each country (the country
can make net transfers to other countries only by having higher income than its
expenditure), including the transfers. A country’s trade must be balanced at
the world market prices if it does not make or receive any income transfer from
other countries. It must have trade surplus if it is making a net transfer (τm >
0) and trade deficit, if it receives a net transfer10.
Finally, (12) states that, in the world as a whole, it is impossible to make
net transfers. The three sets of equilibrium conditions determine individual
welfare levels, the world market prices qw, and implied domestic prices pm, and
the transfer of one of the countries as a function of national trade policies and
transfers from othe countries. With (5), the national welfare levels can then be
also expressed as function of world trade policies.
To study the implications of (small) tariﬀ reforms, the system of equations
(10)-(12), with (7) substituted in, is diﬀerentiated. The result is the equation
A1duG +A2dq +A3dt+A4dτ = 0 (13)
where
A1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
S1q1u1G
1 . . . SMqMuMG
M
pw|S1q1u1G
1 0 . . 0
0 . . . 0
. . . . .
0 . . . 0
0 . . . pw|SMqMuMG
M
0 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(14)
A2 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
X
m
¡
Smqmqm − SmqmuGm∆m|Empmqm
¢
S1|q1 + p
w|
³
S1pmqm − S1p1u1G1∆1|E1p1q1
´
.
.
SM|qM + p
w|
³
S1pMqM − SMpMuMGM∆M|EMpMqM
´
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(15)
10Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000a,b) show that one can, under quite general conditions,
reach the the welfare improvements as with multilateral tariﬀ and transfer scheme with a
multilateral tariﬀ reform alone. Naturally, the two tariﬀ reforms are not identical.
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A3 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
S1q1p1 − S1q1u1G1∆1|E1p1p1 . . . SMqMpM − SMqMuGM∆M|EMpMpM
pw|
³
S1p1p1 − S1p1u1G1∆1|E1p1p1
´
0 . . 0
0 . 0 . 0
. . . . .
. . . . 0
0 . . 0 pw|
³
SMpMpM − SMpMuMGM∆M|EMpMpM
´
0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(16)
and
A4 =
⎡
⎣
0
−IM×M
ι|M
⎤
⎦ (17)
Here IM×M = identity matrix with dimension M, and ιM = M-vector of ones.
4 The potential for policy reform with merit
goods
There are two issues that will be studied. One is the search for conditions
under which a Pareto-improving trade policy reform exists, and the second is to
characterise, if possible, the types of policy reforms that produces the Pareto-
improvement. The answer to the first problem can be obtained through the
Motzkin’s theorem (Mangasarian 1969). Since we are searching for a solution
to (13) that satisfies duG > 0, in the present context the theorem reads as
follows:
M: There exists a strict Pareto-improving multilateral policy reform if and
only if there does not exist a vector λ ∈ RN−1+K+1 for which λ|A1 < 0,
λ| [A2, A3, A4] = 0.
For further analysis, it is convenient tp partition the vector λ as λ| =
(λ|1 , λ
|
2 , λ3), where λ
|
1 is a 1×(N − 1) vector and λ|2 a 1×K vector. Define next
the generalized substitution matrix eSmqq ≡ Smqmqm −SmqmuGm∆m|Empmqm and the
generalized world substitution matrix eSqq ≡X
m
¡
Smqmqm − SmqmuGm∆m|Empmqm
¢
.
To be able to get ahead the following assumption is made:
A2: The matrices eSmpp, m = 1, ...,M , and eSpp have all rank N − 1.
Usually the same assumption is made of Smpmpm and
X
m
Smpmpm . Obviously,
for small enough diﬀerences ∆m between national and individual welfares these
assumptions imply A2. Indeed, the following stronger global result holds for eSmqq:
If Smqmqm has rank N-1 then eSmqq has rank N-1 also if∆m|EmpmqmSmqmqmSmqmuGm 6=
1 (Abadir and Magnus 2006, p. 87, Exercise 4.28). It should also be noted thateSmqq and eSqq, unlike Smqmqm and consequently alsoX
m
Smqmqm , cannot be assumed
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to be positive definite (they are not even symmetric) which complicates the
analysis. The economics of A2 is straightforward: one just assumes that also
national preferences allow enough substitutability in net exports.
The conditions for the existence of a Pareto-improving multilateral policy
reform to exist can now be restated as: A Pareto-improving reform exists if
there does not exist λ| = (λ|1 , λ
|
2 , λ3) such that
∀m : λ|1Smqmum + λ3pw|Smpmum < 0 (18)
λ|1 eSqq + λ3pw|
"X
m
¡
Smpmqm − SmpmumGm∆m|Empmqm
¢#
= 0 (19)
∀m : λ|1
£
Smqmpm − SmqmumGm∆m|Empmpm
¤
+λ3pw|
£
Smpmpm − SmpmumGm∆m|Empmpm
¤
= 0
(20)
In (18) assumption A1 has been used. By defining eSpq ≡Pm ¡Smpmqm − SmpmumGm∆m|Empmqm¢,eSmpmpm ≡ Smpmpm−SmpmumGm∆m|Empmpm ,and eSmqmpm ≡ Smqmpm−SmqmumGm∆m|Empmpm
one can solve from (19)
λ|1 = eSpq eS−1qq
and (20) becomes
λ3pw|
heSmpmpm − eSpq eS−1qq eSmqmpmi = 0 (21)
which can be rewritten as
λ3bpw| eSmpmpm = 0 (22)
where bpw| ≡ pw| − ³0, pw| eSpq eS−1qq ´. Now (18) can be expressed as
λ3
³
β1, ..., βM
´
< 0 (23)
where βm ≡ bpw|Smpmum . bpw| is the shadow price for projects. It takes into
account the impact of the project on world market prices (this is exactly the termeSpq eS−1qq ). The crucial point is that now we look at the projects through their
impact on national welfare, not on private utility. As usual, the interpretation
of bpw| as the shadow price requires that the Hatta-normality condition holds:
A3 βm < 0 for all m.
When A3 holds then a project whose value is evaluated at the shadow prices,
increases national welfare if the value of the project is positive, and reduces it
if the project value is negative. Since Smpmum = −Empmum and pmEmpmum > 0,
A3 is a natural condition, and is also assumed to hold here. It can be called
the Generalized2 Hatta Normality Condition11. A further interpretation of the
shadow prices will be given below.
Finally, to simplify some of the formulas below, the marginal utility of money
is normalized to unity in each country:
11Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991) call A3 with Gm = 0 the Generalized Hatta Normality
Condition.
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A4 −Smum = Emum = 1.
Equations (22) and (22) give immediately the following results.
First (22) and (23) imply that
Lemma 1 There does not exist a Pareto-improving multilateral trade reform if
and only if there exists λ3 such that (22) and (23) hold.
This gives the following corollary
Corollary 2 With A3 a Pareto-improving multilateral trade reform exists if
and only if there exists a country m such that bpw| eSmpmpm 6= 0.
Proof. Clearly, if bpw| eSmpmpm 6= 0, (22) holds only if λ3 = 0. But then (23)
cannot hold by A3. Also, if bpw| eSmpmpm = 0, (22) and (23) hold e.g. by choosing
λ3 = 1 (again by A3), and no multilateral Pareto-improving reform exists.
These results generalize Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.1. from Turunen-Red
and Woodland (1991).
A further characterization of the conditions for the existence of a mutually
beneficial trade reform is made diﬃcult by the fact that, in contrast with the
case of no merit goods, now pm| eSmpmpm 6= 0, in general. Intuitively, however,
one would think that, given (5) and (7), that this type of a homogeneity as-
sumption holds for a vector that is corrects the national market price levels for
the divergence between private and national welfares. This holds, as one can
show
Proposition 3 Assume A2. Then, for each country there exists bm, unique up
to a factor of proportionality, such that
(pm + bm)| eSmpmpm = 0 (24)
Proof. To show this, notice that the equation (pm + bm)| eSmpmpm = 0 can be
rewritten, using the definition of eSmpmpm , as
bm|
¡
Smpmpm − SmpmumGm∆m|Empmpm
¢
= pm|SmpmumG
m∆m|Empmpm
which is equivalent to¡
Smpmpm −Empmpm∆mGmS
m|
pmum
¢
bm = Empmpm∆
mGmSm|pmump
m (25)
Given that the rank of Smpmpm − Empmpm∆mGmS
m|
pmum is N-1, there is always
the possibility that this system of equations is inconsistent. But since now
clearly pm|
¡
Smpmpm −Empmpm∆mGmS
m|
pmum
¢
= 0 = pm|Empmpm∆mGmS
m|
pmumpm,
the system is consistent and can be solved. To get to the solution, note first
that the RHS of (25) equals (by just directly writing out the matrix product)
eEm = −Gm
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
PN
i=1E
m
pm1 p
m
i
∆miPN
i=1E
m
pm2 p
m
i
∆mi
.
.PN
i=1E
m
pmNp
m
i
∆mi
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡ −Gm
∙ PN
i=1E
m
pm1 p
m
i
∆mi
Em2
¸
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where A4 and the fact that Eu = p|Epu has been used.
This finally gives the solution bm| ≡
¡
bm1 , b
m|
n−1
¢
as
bmN−1 =
³eSmqq´−1 ³−GmEm2 − eSmqmpm1 bm1 ´ (26)
which, for the normalization bm1 = 0, reduces to
bmN−1 = −
³eSmqq´−1GmEm2 (27)
Proposition 3 can be used to characterize in somewhat more detail the con-
ditions for the existence of mutually beneficial multilateral trade reforms. The
following is a generalization of the existing results:
Proposition 4 Assume there are two countries, l and m, such that pl+ bl and
pm + bm are not proportional to each other. Assume also that A2 holds. Then
there exists a Pareto-improving trade policy reform.
Proof. By A2, all solutions x to x| eSnpnpn = 0 are equal to pn+bn up to a factor
of proportionality. Since pl+ bl and pm+ bm are not proportional to each other,
at least one of them cannot be proportional to bpw. But then for that country
conditions in Corollary 2 hold.
In a similar fashion it is obvious that
Proposition 5 If pm + bm are proportional to bpw for all m, then no Pareto-
improving multilateral trade policy reform exists.
The last proposition implies that completely free trade is not Pareto-optimal:
If (take the factor of proportionality to be unity) pl+ bl = pm+ bm then pl - pm
= bm - bl. Thus, if bm - bl 6= 0, the price levels cannot be equal (up to a factor
of proportionality), and free trade cannot be a Pareto-optimal situation.
Clearly also, in general, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, or the
requirement that countries should treat all its trading partners in a similar
manner, e.g. by not imposing higher import tariﬀs on imports from some coun-
tries than on imports from some other countries, is consistent with the Pareto-
optimality. But the tariﬀs countries impose do not have to be identical. Hence,
here Pareto-optimality does not require that trade policies are uniform or that
a world with harmonized tariﬀs would be optimal.12
The previous propositions also lend support for the theory of "natural trad-
ing areas" (Nordström 1995 provides a theory for them, Panagariya 2002 criti-
cizes the notion). For countries m and l with bm - bl = 0, in the Pareto-optimal
12My wording in this paragraph has been somewhat loose. The requirement for Pareto-
optimality implies that countries with similar b0s have identical domestic prices. This means
that if, for some particular good, the other country is exporting it and then other importing,
the other country should be using an export subsidy/export tax and the other an import
tariﬀ/import subsidy.
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situation the goods prices are equal to each other. Consider the case in which
the the trading nations are partitioned in groups in such a way that countries
which have the same b belong to the same group. To the extent that countries
with similar b’s are located next to each other, this gives a role for regional trad-
ing blocs in supporting the eﬃcient multilateral equilibrium. E.g. the largest
share of expenditures from EU budget goes as a support to agriculture. To
the extent this reflects national preferences in EU member countries and not
lobbying by agricultural interest groups it can be eﬃcient.
The optimal trading areas identified here are close but not identical to non-
preferential trading blocs discussed by Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006).
Here also the trading blocs are non-preferential in the sense that also the trading
partners impose trade taxes/subsidies on each other to equalize the consumer
and producer prices within the bloc13. But in contrast to Raimondos-Møller
- Woodland clubs, the establishment of the groups implied by the previous
proposition involves, in general, income transfers between all trading nations,
not only between the group members.
It is straighforward to show, using A2 and the previous Proposition that
one can within the framework here also construct Pareto-optimal similar non-
preferential trading clubs than in Raimondos-Møller - Woodland (see their
Proposition 1): Take the initial situation and consider a group of countries
with "similar"14 government preferences. These countries can then, through
within group transfers, find a common price vector that keeps the net trade of
the club with the rest of the world constant. This keeps the welfare in rest of
the world unchanged but helps the bloc countries to get to the contract curve.
With proper transfers welfare of all club members increases.
Here the non-preferentail trading clubs emerge in a multilateral context with
multilateral income transfers. In the Raimondos-Møller - Woodland case all
countries can become members of some club and increase their welfare, and
thus the trading nations can be partitioned into separate trading clubs. This
partitioning is arbitrary. In the framework here the trading clubs arise en-
dogenously and improve the welfare all the countries. Also, the welfare of all
countries would be higher than in the Raimondos-Møller - Woodland clubs that
can arise in the present framework.Thus, Raimondos-Møller - Woodland clubs
are going alone trading clubs while the clubs here are genuine multilateral clubs.
To interpret the existing trading blocs from the point of view of the clubs just
outlined is certainly too far-fetched. At the same time, there are elements e.g. in
EU trade policies vis a vis non-member countries that could be interpeted from
this point of view. EU has negotiated several trading agreements with many
developing countries (like Lome and Cotonou agreements) that involve a transfer
to income to these countries. Similarly, EU sugar policies have contained an out-
13 If all goods are Armington substitutes then it is possible e.g. that tariﬀs on goods imported
from group members are lower than on goods imported from non-members.
14This is somewhat loose again. Strictly speaking we are looking for countries for which
with common domestic price vectors also the b’s are identical. The minimum requirement for
similarity is that for the chosen joint commodity price vector within a club the member b’ are
equal.
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of-bloc income transfer element (see section 3). Currently aid-for-trade is a hot
topic in both aid agencies and multilateral trade negotiations.
Finally, Proposition 3 helps in interpreting the shadow prices, and this
again helps in reaching a deeper interpretation of the implications of Pareto-
optimality. Recall that the shadow price is
bpw| = pw| −Ã0,X
m
pw| eSmpmqm eS−1qq
!
(28)
Assume now, without loss of generality, that tm1 = 0 for all countries. Also,
without loss of generality, one can set bm1 = 0 for all countries. Then (28) can
be rewritten as
bpw| = pw| −Ã0,X
m
h
Gmbm|N−1 eSm|qmqm − tm|N−1 eSmqmqmi eS−1qq
!
(29)
Here bmN−1 and t
m
N−1 denote the (N − 1) × 1 vectors obtained from bm and tm
by setting the first element equal to 0. From (29) one sees right away that with
completely free multilateral trade the world shadow prices do not, in general,
equal the world market price. This is because the shadow prices now reflect the
national preferences, not the individual preferences. The shadow prices must
correct for this diﬀerence. World market prices are proper shadow prices in an
interesting special case. If
P
mG
mbm|N−1 eSm|qmqm = 0 then with tariﬀs removed
the shadow price coincides with the world market price. This requires in a
sense that national values are in conflict with each other: with opposite values
the world on average does not put any value apart from private value on the
consumption of goods.
(29) also reveals that the proper shadow prices include a term that is a
weighted sum of individual country national preferences,
P
m
h
Gmbm|N−1 eSm|qmqmi eS−1qq .
The shadow prices thus pool together the national biases to an international
weighted average of these biases, a sort of world government bias. Since in the
state where no Pareto improving reforms exist pm = bpw − bm, national trade
policies should be based on national deviations from the world average bias.
Pascal Lamy, in the quotation above, interprets the WTO Dispute Settlement
system, in particular the Appellate Body, as guarding properly the national
collective preferences. (29) shows that the issue are the relative values, values
of a nation relative to the "global values".
5 Reforms
Having characterized the conditions under which a Pareto-improving trade pol-
icy reform exists one must try to find concrete reforms that help to achieve the
improvement. Much of the discussion in literature has focused on rules that
apply uniformly to all countries. E.g. a radial reform requires all countries to
reduce tariﬀs at the same proportional rate. But in practice the multilateral
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negotiations have led to reforms that allow tariﬀ reduction speed to diﬀer across
countries. Negotiations determine the bound tariﬀs that set the upper bound
for actual tariﬀs. Similarly one of the main issues in negotiations has been the
Special and Diﬀerential treatment of developing countries. In this section we
show that Pareto-improving tariﬀ reforms can be consistent with such special
national treatment.
One can easily generalize Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.1. by Turunen-Red
and Woodland (1991) as follows:
Lemma 6 A welfare improving reform along a, i.e. dt = adα, dα 6= 0, exists
if and only if there does not exist a scalar μ such that
μ
h
β1, ..., βM
i
< 0, μγ = 0
where γ ≡
P
m bp| eSmppam.
and
Lemma 7 A welfare improving reform in the direction a, i.e. dt = adα, dα >
0, exists if and only if there does not exist a scalar μ such that
μ
h
β1, ..., βM , γ
i
< 0
An obvious consequence of the last lemma is that
Corollary 8 If γ 6= 0, then a welfare improving reform along a exists.
Corollary 9 If γ > 0, then a welfare improving reform in the direction of a
exists.
To be more concrete, consider the following reform:
dtm = (−εmtm + δmbm) dα (30)
This is a reform that combines the traditional radial reform where tariﬀ changes
are conditioned on existing tariﬀ levels with a reform that takes into account to
existing national or polittical preferences. Consider first the case with εm = 0
for all m. The, from (25) one can directly calculate, by setting bm1 = 0 that
bm =
"
0³eSmqq´−1 £−GmEmqp∆mEm|pu ¤
#
pm (31)
With this one can show
Lemma 10
bp| eSmppbm = (32)
−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆mEmu
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Proof. First, from the definition of the shadow price
bp| = (1, q|)−µ0, (1, q|) eSpq ³eSqq´−1¶ =
(1, q|)−
µ
0, eS1q ³eSqq´−1 + q|¶ = µ1,−eS1q ³eSqq´−1¶
This leads to
bp| eSmpp =∙eSm11 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1 eSmq1, eSm1q − eS1q ³eSqq´−1 eSmqq¸
Using (31) one finds
bp| eSmppbm = (33)
−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆mEm|pu pm =
−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆mEmu
as claimed.
Since now am = δmbm the following trade reform is a Pareto-improving trade
reform (using A4):
Proposition 11 The reform with δm = 0 if
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m=
0, δm = η
µ
−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m¶−1 if −Gm ∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m
6= 0, η > 0, is a Pareto-improving reform in the direction of a.
With this reform γ ≡
P
m bp| eSmppam = Pm bp| eSmppδmbm > 0 and the con-
ditions for a reform benefitting all countries are satisfied. In this reform im-
port barriers in some countries are raised, in some countries lowered to make
the reform work. A uniform reform with δm = δ for all countries works only
if
P
m−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m 6= 0, while the reform with
country specific trade policy change works in all countries for sure. If we restrict
reforms in the direction of b≡
£
b1| , ..., bM|
¤|
, then the requirement for successful
reform is more stringent, i.e.
P
m−Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m>
0 with δ > 0. Hence, a multilateral reform with country specific tariﬀ adjust-
ments tied to their national preferences can succed under more general condi-
tions that are required for a uniform multilateral tariﬀ adjustment to succeed.
Note, however, that the informational requirements to design the appropriate
reform in either setting are the same. The parameter η in the proposition can be
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interpreted as a weight given in multilateral negotiations to the national goals.
Its role will become clear below.
The intuition for the result is clear: No Pareto-improvements are possible if
in all countries national prices corrected for the national preferences are equal-
ized with the world shadow prices. If they are not eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1
is a measure for the diﬀerence that will disappear when the reform proceeds.
The reform of Proposition 11 can be interpreted also as a sum of unilat-
eral tariﬀ reforms of the type studied in Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991)15 .
Clearly, a reform specified in the proposition and undertaken by only one coun-
try will be Pareto-improving if −Gm
∙eSm1q ³eSmqq´−1 − eS1q ³eSqq´−1¸Emqp∆m 6= 0
in that country.
Consider next the reform tied to existing tariﬀ levels and set δm = 0 for
all m. Since tm = pm - pw, bp| eSmppτm = −bp| eSmpppw, using the definition of eSmpp.
Then
bp| eSmpppw = (34)eSm11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSmq1 + ³eSm1q − eSm1q eS−1qq eSmqq´ q
As in Proposition 11 we get
Proposition 12 A multilateral tariﬀ reform with country specific tariﬀ adjust-
ment is a Pareto-improvement, if εm = 0 when eSm11−eS1q eS−1qq eSmq1+³eSm1q − eSm1q eS−1qq eSmqq´ q
= 0, εm > 0 when eSm11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSmq1 + ³eSm1q − eSm1q eS−1qq eSmqq´ q > 0 and εm < 0 ifeSm11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSmq1 + ³eSm1q − eSm1q eS−1qq eSmqq´ q < 0.
Proposition 12 provides one rationale for e.g. the Special and diﬀerential
treatment: as diﬀerences in tariﬀ adjustments are shown to be potentially ben-
eficial for all countries. Also, it shows that, in general, a multilateral trade
agreement need not call for tariﬀ reductions from all countries. Even a stronger
claim can be made: country specific tariﬀ adjustments can be designed to pro-
duce Pareto-improvement under conditions when the uniform tariﬀ reduction
requirement does not.
A multilateral agreement calling for an equiproportionate reduction of tariﬀ
rates, εm = ε > 0, in all countries succeeds ifX
m
bp| eSmpppw = (35)
eS11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSq1 > 0
Without merit goods the condition eS11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSq1 > 0 holds for sure and
uniform tariﬀ reductions are welfare improving for all countries. With merit
15The reform is unilateral only in the sense that tariﬀs are changed in one country only.
The reform is multilateral as there may be a need for multilateral income transfers.
17
goods the sign of eS11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSq1 is unclear. This means that, in general, a
multilateral tariﬀ reform calling for a general reduction in tariﬀs is not a Pareto-
improvement in the presence of merit goods. In fact, it may be possible that
there is a need for a general tariﬀ increase. An interesting aspect is that the
likelihood for a general reduction of tariﬀs to be Pareto-improving is larger if
simultaneously country specific deviations due to merit goods are allowed. With
the reform specified in Proposition 11 a multilateral reform with an equipropor-
tionate reduction in tariﬀs, εm = ε > 0, succeeds if
ε
³eS11 − eS1q eS−1qq eSq1´+X
m
bp| eSmppδmbm > 0 (36)
This can hold even if eS11− eS1q eS−1qq eSq1 < 0. In this sense, flexibility in multilat-
eral tariﬀ negotiations can help in finding a tariﬀ reduction formula that benefits
all. In fact, by choosing η in Proposition 11 large enough one can make sure
that the inequality (36) holds. Thus, by choosing the proper weight for the na-
tionally specific part accounting for the divergence between private and national
preferences in the reform formula, a necessarily Pareto-improving multilateral
reform can be designed. Some aspects of actual multilateral trade reforms seem
to corrspond to this idea. Thus, e.g. the parctice of negotiating about bound
tariﬀs, not about actual tariﬀs can be interpreted as being negotiations about
nationally specific part of the tariﬀ adjustment. This can be done even when
the general level of bound tariﬀs is reduced. Thus
Proposition 13 A multilateral reform incorporating an equiproportionate re-
duction in tariﬀs in all countries but allowing a country-specific adjustment to
tariﬀs the reflect national policy concerns can always be designed to be Pareto-
improving.
Why doses this work, what sense is there in reducing all tariﬀs (subsidies)
uniformly but allow then individual countries to raise them? The basic reason
is that without trade agreement tariﬀs may be at an ineﬃcient level. In general,
the Nash-equilibrium tariﬀs are not Pareto-optimal, as shown e.g. in Bagwell
and Staiger (2002). This intuition carries over from the standard models to the
model with country specific merit goods. When all countries reduce the general
level of protection the protection a country wants to give to some sectors can
be delivered by lower tariﬀs.
6 Conclusions
The main result of the paper is that domestic policy concerns or nationalism in
general, modelled here by distinguishing between national and consumer pref-
erences through merit goods, need not prevent the formation of multilateral
tariﬀ reforms (including multilateral tariﬀ reductions) provided that interna-
tional preference diﬀerentials are properly reflected in the agreements. The key
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to this result is that even with diﬀerent national policy preferences the world
shadow prices that should guide policy making are identical across countries.
National trade policies should then reflect the diﬀerence between the individual
country policy preferences from a "global" policy preference which is a properly
weighted average of the national preferences. This result directly gives the result
that a group of countries with similar national culture form a non-preferential
trading club. Finally, the piecemeal multilateral trade policy reform was char-
acterized. It was shown that an equiproportionate reduction in tariﬀs in all
countries with country-specific adjustment to tariﬀs the reflect national policy
concerns can always be designed to be Pareto-improving.
The multilateral reforms usually analyzed in the piecemeal reform literature
do not correspond to the reforms actually negotiated. The reforms analyzed in
this paper may come a little bit closer to the actual reforms. E.g. the practice
of negotiation over tariﬀ bindings and reductions in bound tariﬀs but not over
applied tariﬀs is consistent with the Pareto-improving reforms implied by the
theory presented. here. But the point is more general: There is a need to study
also within the piecemeal policy reform theory the implications of reforms that
come out of the actual negotiations and the relationship between rules that the
theory supplies and the actual rules.
In the citation given in the introductory section to this paper, Pascal Lamy
suggested that the WTO Appellate Body is a body that protects the genuine
national policy preferences and guarantees that they are not used only as a
disguise to protectionist policies. It would be interesting to model the work of
the body to see under which conditions the claim is true.
We have studied here only multilateral tariﬀ reforms. The theory of optimal
policies in the presence of non-economic objectives (see the introduction) has
taught that for small open economies at least trade policies are optimal only
when the non-economic objective directly concerns trade (like self-suﬃciency).
In the settings where reforms of any type can aﬀect terms of trade it is not
obvious that, form a single country point of view, the optimal Nash policies in
general rule out the use of trade policies as a part of optimal policy package. An
interesting extension of the present framework would be to consider peacemeal
policy reforms that allow other types of policies to be used than just trade poli-
cies. An important issue is whether a multilateral policy reform that pushes the
world towards free trade with simultaneosly national consumption/production
taxes/subsidies being adjusted to achieve the social optimum exists. One can
conjecture that such a reform exists as even without adjustments of national
policy instruments the government shadow prices should be equalized, as shown
in this paper. This type of an analysis would give a new angle to the problem
of issue linkage. But at any rate, merit good arguments often involve trade, e.g.
protection of national culture often is an argument for restricting the imports
of some foreign goods or services.
Merit goods may not be the only reason why national policy preferences diﬀer
from individual consumer preferences. Political economy concerns are certainly
another factor. The point made here is that by explicitly modelling the diﬀerence
one can get some mileage in the analysis of policy reforms. Political economy
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concerns also point to another obvious extension of the analysis conducted in
the paper: An interesting question is whether one can find multilateral reforms
that improve both national and individual welfare in all countries.
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